The Math/Stats Colloquium is very pleased to have our own Dashiell Fryer (SJSU) speaking on “Instability in Simple Decision Schemes”.  It has been shown that a smooth payoff positive game dynamic has a linearization that is a non-negative constant times the linearization for the replicator dynamics.  We will use this to show that in a game of Rock-Paper-Scissors where the payoff associated with losing is larger in absolute value than the payoff associated with winning, no payoff positive game dynamic with nontrivial linearization can be asymptotically stable at the unique Nash equilibrium.  This result will be extended to include all continuous payoff positive game dynamics using other methods.

Background: Differential equations and Calculus III are assumed; no background in game theory required.

• Date: Wed Mar 09
• Time: 3-3:50pm
• Room: MH320
• Snacks: 2:30pm in MH331B

Hope to see you there!

Upcoming events:

• Next colloquium, Wed Apr 13 (second week back from Spring Break)

Colloquium web page: http://www.math.sjsu.edu/~hsu/colloq/